

# Teim



## TEIM Election Watch Analysis

### ELECTORAL REPORT:

### MOROCCO/Parliamentary elections 7 September 2007

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## **Background of the elections:**

The second parliamentary elections held during the reign of Mohammed VI were for a second consecutive round of five-year legislative terms at the end of a summer in which possible and imminent terrorist attacks kept the country in a state of maximum alert.<sup>1</sup>

Moroccan immigrants abroad, yet again, were not given the chance to participate in the elections from abroad and thus had no possibility of being represented in parliament, despite the monarch's promise in a speech given to the nation on 6 November 2005.<sup>2</sup>

As is now customary, and under the new law on parties passed in February, 2006, 5 new political parties were created months before the elections: the Al-badil Al-hadari Party (PBH), the Party of Renaissance and Virtue (PRV) and the Umma (or Nation) Party<sup>3</sup>, all three of an Islamist bent, as well as the Moroccan Union for Democracy (UMD) and the leftist Labour Party (PT).

This year also saw the creation of unions and coalitions to confront the legislative groups of the year: the Popular Movement, a union of the Popular Movement (MP), the National Popular Movement (MNP) and the Democratic Union (UD); the fusion of the Democratic Socialist Party (PSD) and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP); the coalition of the Al-Ahd Party with the National Democratic Party (PND) and the coalition of the Avant Garde Social Democratic (PADS), the National Ittihadi Congress Party (CNI) and the United Socialist Party (PSU).

## **Quantitative indices of democracy:**

Morocco was classified in the following democratic performance rankings just before the elections:

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1 In the spring, Casablanca, the financial capital of Morocco, was the scene of some unsuccessful attacks. On 11 March and on 10 and 14 April, six suicide bombers blew themselves up in the city. In the imperial city of Meknes, located 136 km from Rabat, another failed attack took place on 12 August. The Strait Movement Operation (*OPE*) that year was affected by strong security measures due to the alerts applied both by Morocco and by Spain. Kilometres of traffic jams were reported at the ports of Algeciras Bay and Tangiers as well as at the Ceuta and Melilla border crossings.

2 The only precedent for the participation of Moroccan immigrants abroad is an election that occurred during the 1984 parliamentary elections.

3 The Umma Party continues to have problems with being granted legal status from the Interior Ministry.

Measurement	Name and year of report or database	Institution	Index	Points, ranking and classification
Political rights and freedom	<a href="#">Freedom House Report 2007</a>	Freedom House (FH)	PR: political rights CL: civil liberties	PR: 5, CL: 4 (Scale of 1, free to 7, not free) <b>Classification: Partly free</b>
Degree of democracy in earlier elections	<a href="#">Polyarchy 2.0 2000</a>	Peace Research Institute of Oslo and Tatu Vanhanen	ID: Synthetic democracy index, Part: participation, Comp: competition	ID: 3.89, max. 49 Part: 34.3, max. 70 Comp: 11.34, max. 70 (Democracy minimum: ID: 5, Part: 10, Comp: 30) <b>Classification: non-democratic</b>
Consolidation of authoritarian and democratic institutions	<a href="#">Polity IV 2004</a>	Center for International Development and Conflict Management, Univ. of Maryland	Democracy: consolidation of democratic institutions Autocracy: authoritarian consolidation Polity: synthesis of both	Democracy: 0 Autocracy: 6 Polity: -6 (Scale of +10, very democratic to -10, very authoritarian) <b>Classification: average authoritarian consolidation</b>
Perception of corruption	<a href="#">Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2007</a>	Transparency International (TI)	TICPI: corruption perceptions index	<b>TCPI: 3.5 points out of 10,</b> (Scale of 1, very corrupt to 10, not at all corrupt) Rank: 72 out of 179 countries
Management of political and economic change	<a href="#">Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2006</a>	Bertelsmann Foundation	MI: Management Index, quality of transformation management	MI: <b>4.77 points out of 10,</b> Rank: 62 out of 119 countries Classification: Management with moderate success
Democracy, including press status and corruption	<a href="#">World Democracy Audit May 2007</a>	World Audit	World Democracy Rank: political freedom (FH) + press and corruption (TI)	World Democracy Ranking: <b>93 out of 150 countries,</b> <b>division 4 out of 4</b>

### Quantitative analysis of electoral democracy:

The elections analysed in this profile produced the following electoral democracy quantitative results:

Degree of democracy in these elections	Measurement of democracy in these elections according to the Polyarchy 2.0 index, calculated by <a href="#">TEIM Election Watch</a>	ID: 10.6, max. 49 Part: 19.3 <sup>4</sup> max. 70 Comp: 55.1 <sup>5</sup> max. 70 (Democracy minimum: ID: 5, Part: 10, Comp: 30)	Classification of the elections: <b>democratic</b>
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4 Participation was calculated using a participation rate of 5,721,073 voters and an estimated population of 29,680,069, according to the United Nations Population Division (2006).

5 Competition was calculated by adding the percentage of seats of all the parties not in the government coalition (PI, USFP, RNI and PPS; the MP ended up leaving this government).

## **Definition of the electoral system and parties:**

The proportional representation system (PR List)<sup>6</sup> is used. The elections are held with direct universal suffrage on a majority basis in one round. Of the 325 seats that make up the House of Representatives,<sup>7</sup> 295 are chosen through local lists that correspond to the number of constituencies (95 in 2007 versus 91 in the 2002 elections), while the election of the 30 remaining seats takes place through a national list reserved for women candidates. The national list requires a threshold of 6% of the votes (5% in 2002) to obtain the first seat. The reservation of a 30-seat quota to guarantee better women's representation in parliament does not follow any law or legislation. It is only a verbal agreement between all the political agents.

## **Impact of the electoral process and size of the constituency on the elections:**

The electoral system applied here leads to the fragmentation of political representation in parliament, which is currently formed by 23 political parties plus 5 deputies with no political affiliation.

The design of the electoral map and the number of seats in each constituency help, in turn, to solidify the trend towards political fragmentation. After the new modification of the electoral map, the number of constituencies increased from 91 in 2002 to 95 in 2007. The goal of the new electoral design was to reduce the constituencies – which were quite large – that were represented in the last legislature by more than 4 deputies. This reduced the possibilities that a single party could win a second seat in the same constituency. With the new distribution, the number of seats per constituency was set at between 3 and 4, except in two cases, where they are represented by only two deputies.

## **Election results:**

Participation: 37%\*; 5,721,073 voters out of 15,462,362 registered voters.  
Null votes: 19%\*. 1,131,393 (19.77%) corresponding to the local lists and 1,634,579 (28.59%) to the national list.

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6 The names of the electoral systems are those used by IDEA, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. For details, see the Electoral System Design on their webpage: <http://www.idea.int/esd/world.cfm>

7 The Moroccan parliament is made up of two houses, one of representatives and the other of advisors (the senate).

\* Official data. The turnout rate and the null vote were published without decimals, as announced by the Interior Minister, Chakib Benmoussa, on 8 September.

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Party Abbreviation	LOCAL LISTS			NATIONAL LIST			TOTAL	
	Votes won	% Votes	Seats won	Votes won	% Votes	Seats won	Total seats	% of seats
PI	494 256	10.7	46	480 561	11.8	6	<b>52</b>	<b>16</b>
PJD	503 396	10.9	40	545 636	13.4	6	<b>46</b>	<b>14.15</b>
MP	426 849	9.3	36	410 197	10	5	<b>41</b>	<b>12.62</b>
RNI	447 244	9.7	34	429 053	10.5	5	<b>39</b>	<b>12</b>
USFP	408 945	8.9	33	389 471	9.5	5	<b>38</b>	<b>11.69</b>
UC	335 116	7.3	27	ANNULLED <sup>8</sup>			<b>27</b>	<b>8.31</b>
PPS	248 103	5.4	14	253 929	6.2	3	<b>17</b>	<b>5.23</b>
FFD	207 982	4.5	9	200 846	4.9	0	<b>9</b>	<b>2.77</b>
MDS	168 960	3.7	9	163 799	4	0	<b>9</b>	<b>2.77</b>
PND-ALAH	139 688	3	9	217 827	5.3	0	<b>9</b>	<b>2.77</b>
PADS-CNI-PSU	123 897	2.7	6	119 688	2.9	0	<b>6</b>	<b>1.85</b>
PT	140 224	3	5	139 907	3.4	0	<b>5</b>	<b>1.54</b>
PED	131 524	2.9	5	133 023	3.3	0	<b>5</b>	<b>1.54</b>
SAP	81 364	1.8	5	NONE			<b>5</b>	<b>1.54</b>
PRE	83 516	1.8	4	95 456	2.3	0	<b>4</b>	<b>1.23</b>
ALAH	57 952	1.3	3	DID NOT PARTICIPATE			<b>3</b>	<b>0.92</b>
PND	56 176	1.2	2	DID NOT PARTICIPATE			<b>2</b>	<b>0.62</b>
UMD	76 795	1.7	2	76 049	1.9	0	<b>2</b>	<b>0.62</b>
PS	67 786	1.5	2	70 607	1.7	0	<b>2</b>	<b>0.62</b>
ICD	50 278	1.1	1	51 217	1.3	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0.31</b>
PRV	36 781	0.8	1	39 134	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0.31</b>
ADL	34 801	0.8	1	DID NOT PARTICIPATE			<b>1</b>	<b>0.31</b>
PFC	31 207	0.7	1	33 764	0.8	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0.31</b>
PRD	47 141	1	0	50 285	1.2	0	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
PML	46 526	1	0	58 419	1.4	0	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
PDI	31 105	0.7	0	35 922	0.9	0	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
PA	24 384	0.5	0	30 789	0.8	0	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
PCS	22 826	0.5	0	26 240	0.6	0	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
PSU	20 353	0.4	0	DID NOT PARTICIPATE			<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
PE	16 376	0.4	0	23 107	0.6	0	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
BH	15 600	0.3	0	DID NOT PARTICIPATE			<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
PSD	10 973	0.2	0	DID NOT PARTICIPATE			<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
PAN	10 156	0.2	0	DID NOT PARTICIPATE			<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
PLJS	5 452	0.1	0	11 568	0.3	0	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
PADS	3 761	0.1	0	DID NOT PARTICIPATE			<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,607,493</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>295</b>	<b>4,086,494</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>100</b>


Source: Official page of the Interior Ministry ([www.election2007.gov.ma](http://www.election2007.gov.ma)).  
Data prepared by the Ministry.

<sup>8</sup> The Constitutional Union list was annulled because it included a candidate who was not of legal age.

## Evaluative analysis of the elections:

### Participation:

According to the final results announced by the Interior Ministry, national turnout levels only reached 37% (30% in the cities and 43% in rural areas). This is the lowest registered turnout in the electoral history of Morocco.



The 37% turnout rate (5,721,073 voters) only corresponds to registered voters (15,462,362),<sup>9</sup> but the potential electorate is actually 19,981,636, the number recognised by the High Planning Commission (HCP)<sup>10</sup> as the objective for the operation to revise the electorate that was organised shortly before the elections. This means that four and a half million voters have still not been registered, which is almost one fourth of the potential electorate.<sup>11</sup>

The relatively highest turnout rates (55-65%) were registered in the provinces of Western Sahara, while the lowest corresponded to the urban centres in large cities.

In our opinion, the abstentions can be divided between three groups: one that vetoed the elections as being of little use in the process of democratising political life,<sup>12</sup> a second group made up of voters disenchanted with the leftist government who were not seduced by either the PJD or by the other small groups on the left and a third group, mainly rural, that saw the local authorities' lack of participation during the preparations and the evolution of the elections as an indication of the only slight importance of the process. Furthermore, it is

9 Of these, as of 6 September, only 83% had been issued their 'voter registration card', an essential document for voting on the day of the election.

10 The HCP is the official body responsible for censuses and statistics. According to their data, as of 7 September, the number of voters corresponding to the potential population of 29,680,069 registered in the last census taken in September 2004 was almost 20 million.

11 The potential electoral census estimates based on the HCP data are analysed and supported at the end of the article by Bernabé López García; "La danza de los candidatos y el pánico escénico de los líderes (*The Candidates' Dance and the Leaders' Stage Fright*)" Pre-electoral analysis 2, 28 July, 2007.

12 King Mohamed VI corroborated this fact in his throne speech of 30 July: "I am responsible for setting the guidelines for the Moroccan nation. [...] The elections do not consist, at base, of engaging in a useless and untimely competition about the nation's strategic challenges."

important to recognise the influence of the implicit and/or explicit calls made by some political forces acting outside the political system to boycott the elections. These groups include the extreme left party, *Annaÿ Addimoqrati* (Democratic Way) and Abdessalam Yasin's Islamist movement, *Al Adl wal Ihsan* (Justice and Spirituality), which does not represent a political party.

#### Competition:

33 political parties participated in these elections (versus 26 in 2002), along with the independents, with 1,870 local lists (5.53% more than in 2002) and 26 national 'women's' lists, none of which were independent. It is interesting to note that 7 political parties did not present national lists.

18 political parties participated in local lists in more than 50% of the constituencies. The parties with the most candidates were the Istiqlal Party and the USFP with 95, i.e., in all of the constituencies; the PJD and FFD in 94; the PPS in 92; the RNI in 91 and the MP in 90.

#### Transparency:

For the first time in the history of Moroccan elections, the 7 September elections were monitored by international observers. Nearly 50 international observers from 26 countries in Europe, Africa, America, Asia and the Middle East were invited by the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which monitored the elections directly and also authorised nearly 3,000 national observers from the Election Watch Group to do the same.

The neutrality that the government promised to maintain in these elections was obeyed and no serious cases of intervention by the administration on the part of any candidate was recorded, although the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (MAHR) denounced infractions that favoured the independent candidate list and the ex-delegate of the Interior Ministry, Fouad Ali Al-Himma. However, this neutrality was considered to be a 'passive neutrality', which allowed different sorts of electoral fraud for all of the candidates (beginning the electoral campaign before the legal time period, the use of public funds by some candidates to finance elections, vote buying and even 'voter registration card' buying, etc.) as published in the press and confirmed in the report from the MAHR, reports from the *Instance nationale de protection des biens publics au Maroc*,<sup>13</sup> the OHCHR<sup>14</sup> and the *Forum Civil Democratique Marocain* (FCDM) in collaboration with the *Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches en Sciences Sociales* (CERSS).<sup>15</sup>

Some infractions were denounced as electoral fraud. The most discussed case was the fact that Abbas el Fassi was named Prime Minister a few days afterwards.

Although the ballots were transparent and the voting operation was not subject to any serious objections from the observers or the political parties, the gerrymandering of the electoral map and the publication of the final results did receive significant criticism. The new electoral design was interpreted as an efficient way for the administration to reduce the possible triumph of the PJD, since it affected the constituencies where this party had had two seats. The gerrymandering either reduced the number of seats at stake or modified their

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13 The Arabic version of this report can be found at:

<http://membres.lycos.fr/adrare/XYIZNWSK/elemsnts/doc/raportelections2.doc>

14 The Spanish version of this report can be found at: <http://www.ccdh.org.ma/spip.php?article118>

15 The French report on the TEIM/UAM Election Watch Special can be found at: [http://www.uam.es/otroscentros/TEIM/observatorio/Marruecos/Rapport\\_du\\_FCDM.pdf](http://www.uam.es/otroscentros/TEIM/observatorio/Marruecos/Rapport_du_FCDM.pdf)

composition, incorporating areas with a rural population into districts that had been exclusively urban before, given the urban profile of their electorate.

Although the Interior Minister Chakib Benmoussa fulfilled his promise to unveil the provisional results the next day, it took five days for the final results to be published and even more time for the national list.

#### Party representation and debate during the election:

It is fitting to mention that the general atmosphere in these elections both during the electoral campaign and on the day of voting itself was, according to our observation and even according to the politicians themselves, the most discrete and indifferent in the history of Moroccan elections. None of the political parties, despite their promises to resolve the most important problems like unemployment, illiteracy, infrastructure deficiency, etc., presented a complete program that clearly defined its project for society. Therefore, at no time did they manage to convince the population of the importance of its participation in the elections. The efforts made by both the administration and the political parties as well as by some actors in civil society<sup>16</sup> to encourage mass participation by the public were in vain.

The use of television and radio in the campaign (which is no longer a novelty) included agreed-upon spaces and slots that were especially respected by the different parties but had no effect on the electorate. Voters still desired live debates between the leaders of the political parties. Very few people attended the political rallies and the candidates, in the absence of any specific social, economic or political programs and projects created by the parties on a national level, relied on local promises to satisfy particular needs and deficiencies, as if the elections were municipal. Some political party leaders preferred to stay out of the electoral competition, perhaps because they were afraid of defeat, as in the cases of the MP President Mahyubi Ahrdan and Mohamed Yazgui, the secretary of the USFP and other cases with Ministers like Fathallah Oualalou, the Finance Minister, Justice Minister Mohamed Bouzoubaa and Mohamed El Gahs, the Secretary of State for Youth, all from the USFP, the party leading the government coalition. The absence of these leaders made way for the greater presence of notable figures who, while not militants, were presented as the favourites for the seats given their charisma, their importance and their position in the constituency. Most of the political parties turned to this type of candidate to ensure a higher number of seats.

#### Openness:

The PJD, which was represented in almost all of the constituencies, fed many expectations of a change that would positively affect Moroccan political life, making it a notable force. However, the results that it achieved quashed any possibility of change towards political alternation with the current government coalition, since the two trends championed two apparently opposite projects. It seems that these elections are going to turn out to be elections of continuity.

The representation of women in parliament decreased by three seats with respect to the earlier legislature. Leaving aside the 30 women chosen from the national list, only two female deputies were able to ensure a seat competing in the local (mixed) lists, which could be interpreted as indicating a step backwards in the evolution of women's participation in political life.

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<sup>16</sup> Like the 'pseudo-state' association, 2007 DABA, which was created to encourage citizens to participate in large numbers in political life in general and in parliamentary elections in particular.

### Significance:

The 63% abstention rate was the most important data in these elections. On the other hand, the unexpected victory of the Istiqlal Party (PI) was also notable, since it allowed this group to take the baton from the government coalition of the USFP party, which was the most damaged.

The prominent victory of the PI over its allies in the government allowed the monarch and Head of State to choose Abbas El Fassi, leader of the Istiqlal Party, to be his Prime Minister, in accordance with the results of the elections. This has been one of the insistent demands from the political class during the last two decades.<sup>17</sup>

### **Consequences and impact on the political system:**

Low participation is a clear warning of the population's lack of ambition and faith in any real – and truly hoped for – political change coming from the ballot boxes. By abstaining, the electorate wanted to express the scepticism that it feels about institutions (parliament and government) whose power lacks any importance in a political system that maintains them in a weakened state, as well as the disenchantment that they feel towards the current political elite that invited them to make a choice. This elite is largely integrated into a fragmented political system in which no one can stop the multiplication of the number of parties, creating the impression that the social pluralism that the society is experiencing is becoming a political 'Balkanisation': there were 33 parties in the election on 7 September versus 28 in the earlier elections.<sup>18</sup>

The political class is invited – now more than ever – to react to this rupture with the masses. Everything will depend on this reaction, especially on the part of the two political parties whose results reflected the punishment of the disenchanted electorate: the PJD and the USFP.

The way in which these two parties try to absorb their negative electoral results, like blaming the fragmented electoral system, which they have done since the results were unveiled, could perhaps become demands for electoral reforms and possibly reactivate their old demands for constitutional reform in favour of an improved division of powers between the monarch, the parliament and the government.

### **International political reactions:**

The parliamentary elections of 7 September 2007, like all the elections that have taken place in the last decade, were the object of interest from the media in countries that have close ties to Morocco. Specifically, the media in Spain and France followed the electoral process through their correspondents and analyses by academics and politicians that appeared from time to time in the pages of

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<sup>17</sup> According to the Moroccan constitution, the king chooses the Prime Minister who is not required to be the candidate of the winning party or of any particular party. In the earlier legislature (2002-2007), the king named a technocrat with no political affiliation, Driss Jettou, as Prime Minister.

<sup>18</sup> It is important to note that of the 33 participating parties, 26 did not obtain 5% of the votes. Additionally, 9 of these 26 did not win any seats.

newspapers like *El País* and *Le Monde*. The Arab world, in turn, kept abreast of all the details in the Moroccan electoral process through the 'special daily program' that appeared for a month on a television channel with a large audience, Al-Jazeera, and also through correspondents from the media who had set themselves up in Morocco or were sent for the occasion.

The day after the voting, the outcome of the elections in Morocco was one of the top stories in the main international media, where two pieces of data were underscored: the low participation rate and the transparency of the elections. Additionally, the modest results obtained by the PJD were received with great satisfaction.

Regarding the political institutions, several chanceries, foreign ministries and heads of state, both Arabs and from the West, congratulated the monarch and his government for running good elections. The most notable were the messages of congratulations from the United States, the European Union and France. Madrid, in turn, through its Foreign Minister, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, applauded Morocco's efforts to carry out the elections in good conditions, emphasising, according to a note from the Moroccan Press Agency (MAP) that 'they were the best organised in Morocco to date...'. The *Partido Popular*, or People's Party, for its part, congratulated the Istiqlal Party on its electoral triumph.

### **Implications for Spain:**

For various reasons, Moroccan political life is of great interest for Spain, which is reflected in the growing interest among the political class in general and in the Spanish government in particular, in the most important political events in Morocco.

The normal course of the parliamentary elections of 7 September reflected a certain stability in the political scene and transmitted a welcome sensation of calm regarding a country that has lately experienced destabilising factors attributable to the constant socio-economic crisis and terrorist threats.

The 'fear' felt towards a government with 'Islamist' leanings in the case of a PJD victory, which was expressed before the election in certain Spanish business sectors, evaporated after the results were made public. The continuity of the main political parties in the governmental coalition will make it possible to continue the same policies of openness in the Moroccan economy towards Spanish investors and companies.

Regarding the key topics in Spanish-Moroccan relations, the situation will follow the current trend, since the control of foreign relations will continue, whatever the winning party, to be in the hands of the King. It is probable that the most conflictive topics in these relations – the questions of territorial integrity as in the case of Western Sahara and Ceuta and Melilla – will be most affected in parliament and in the government by the nationalist positions of the three parties who won the most votes: the Istiqlal, PJD and the MP. On the other hand, the rupture between the society and the political class, which was revealed by the extremely low turnout rate, could cause young people, who are the most affected by the economic crisis, to search out other horizons far from the promises of the new members of parliament and the government. If the new government does not show a clear and immediate improvement in the results of its management, legal and illegal immigration flows to their northern neighbour will doubtless increase.

## **Conclusions:**

Generally speaking, these elections were elections of continuity and revealed the abyss that separates the political elite from the general population. The citizens understood that with an electoral situation that seems increasingly like a market for votes, formal institutions like parliament and the government cannot be considered as decision-taking places, because the decisions are taken around the King, in his commissions and foundations. The proof of this is that when the citizenry feels motivated to mobilise around great challenges, such as terrorism, injustice in Palestine and Iraq, sexual tourism, etc., or in favour of social demands or, even when they show an interest in international political events like the presidential elections in France, their involvement is intense and the level of mobilisation is high. This is a message that the Moroccan political class still does not understand.

Moroccan society is hoping for extensive reforms on a political level and an economic and social level and not electoral process that only serve to maintain the status quo. At the same time, the apparent calm and stability in these results provide the next government with a new opportunity to reflect on how to once again connect with its citizens, on the condition that it improves its performance and speeds up the pace of its work to satisfy the hopes and dreams of a young, ambitious society.

## **Résumé (en français) des conclusions:**

En général, ces élections sont des élections de la continuité qui ont dévoilé l'abîme qui sépare l'élite politique de ses masses. Les citoyens ont parfaitement démontré qu'au sein d'une scène électorale qui s'apparente d'avantage à un grand souk des voix, des institutions très importantes comme le Parlement ou le Gouvernement ne peuvent pas être considérés comme lieux de prise de décision, parce qu'ils savent que le pouvoir est ailleurs, entre les mains du roi, ses commissions et ses fondations. Hors, quand il s'agit des enjeux, envers lesquels le citoyen se sent invité à se mobiliser, comme contre le terrorisme, les injustices en Palestine ou l'Irak, le tourisme sexuel, etc. ou en faveur des revendications sociales, y compris, quand il s'agit de montrer un certain intérêt envers des événements politiques internationaux comme les présidentielles en France, l'implication s'intensifie et le degré de mobilisation augmente. C'est ce message que la classe politique marocaine n'a pas encore arrivée à capter.

Ce que la société marocaine désire réellement, ce sont des grandes réformes au niveau politique comme au niveau économique et social, et non des processus électoraux qui servent seulement à maintenir le statu quo. Au même temps, l'apparente tranquillité et stabilité que transmettent les résultats, permettra de donner une nouvelle occasion au prochain gouvernement pour réfléchir et extraire des conclusions afin de reconnecter avec les masses en améliorant son efficacité et accélérant le rythme de son travail afin d'atteindre le niveau des espérances et des aspirations d'une société jeune et ambitieuse.